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Speech of Senator Mi!<:e Mansfield (D., Montana)
For Release A.M.s Friday, July 13, 1956

REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY

-

VIII

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST

Mr. President:
This is the eighth in a series of statements on the international
situation and foreign policy which I have been presenting since the beginning of
the session.

The nature of these discussions should now be clear to the Senate.

I shall proceed, therefore, directly to the subject which I propose to consider
today.

My remarks will concer n t he situation in the Far East,
In recent month s , there has been little discussion of American policy

with respect to that region.

Occasionally press reports remind us that a repre-

sentative o f the President ha s b e en carrying on conversations with the Chinese
Co mmunists in Geneva during the past year and that these conversations continue.
They remind us, too, that the guns still fire sporadically in the Formosa Straits
and that Co mmunist forces still confront us across the 38th Parallel in Korea .
What these reports tell us, in short, is that there is neither peace
nor war in the Far East.

There is only a precarious balance between the two .

It is not a static balance,

It is a balance that shifts towards one or the other,

towards peace or war with the constant flow of developments in the \"estern
Paciflc.

If we were mere spectators, we could afford to turn our attention
from this situation as we have been doing these past few months.

We could

:

..
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afford to wile away our time in a discursive debate on the definition of neutralism,
attempting to draw a precise distinction between nice neutralism and not-so-nice
neutralism .

We are not, however, mere spectators.

are deeply involved in the Far East.

For better or worse we

What our policies do or do not do profoundly

affects the shifting balance, towards peace or war, in that region.
That is why, Mr. President, I turn to the Far East in my remarks
today.

It seems to me of the utmost importance that the Senate explore the

question of where we stand in that region and where we are headed .

In raising

this matter, I am fully aware of the difficulties which are involved.

The prob-

lems that beset us in the Far East are complex and dangerous in the extr eme.
In dealing with them, moreover, we carry an added weight .

We bear the scars

cf is sues which a few years ago drove damaging wedges of division deep into the
political life of this country.
The difficulties in the Far East, however, will not become less complex, less dangerous, if we pretend they do not exist .

Nor will they wait for

solution on the healing of political scars of the past.
How long, we may well ask ourselves., will the inexorable flow of
developments in the #estern Pacific permit us an escape of evasion?

In my

opinion , Mr. President, not for very long, perhaps not even until after the
election .

That is why I believe it is in the vital interests of this country to begin

now to face the facts in the Far East, to face them honestly and to face them
without partisanship.

The future of this country beyond the present generation

may well depend on our willingness and capacity to do so.

- 3 These facts, on the whole, are vastly different from those which
characterized the Far East ten years ago, five years, or even a year ago.

They

are, moreover, facts whose implications in many instances are not yet entirely
clear.

Nevertheless, we must make a start,

We must begin to break through

the mist of obscurity which has settled over the situation in the Far East.

Only

as we succeed in doing so can we even hope to develop our policies in a manner
which will be unders toad by the people of the United States -- in a manner which
will serve their interests.
The overriding fact in the Far East is that of Communist China, the
colossus of over 500 million people ruled by the totalitarian dictatorship in Peking .
We cannot close our eyes to it,

It is there, Mr. President.

Communist China

may be an authoritarian reality but it is, nevertheless, a reality .
'l'e do not have a clear picture of what goes on inside that vast and

enigmatic core of Asian communism.
it has n e t been made public,

If the Executive Branch has such a picture

I suspect that, in fact, neither this government nor

that of any other Weste rn nation possesses a detailed grasp of the actual situation
on the Chinese mainland,
What we have are scattered fragments of information.

Returning

travellers note that the flies have been banished from Peking, or the sparrows
from Canton.
pris oners .

~v e

hear of the harrowing experiences of refugees and repatriated

'le get echoes of an uprising in Tibet or Yunnan.
The picture is far from complete.

What we do know, however, the

r eports we have, tell of mass executions, mob trials, sporadic revolts, and
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monstrous oppression.
realm of life.

They tell of an incessant and intense activity in e very

They tell of a new China fed on a mixed diet of militant nationalism,

pro-Sovietism and seething hatred of America.

They also tell o f a rising power,

an expanding industrial po wer, a ruthless political power and a military power
unequalled in modern Chinese his tory.
Mr. President, if we do not comprehend fully what transpires within
Communist China, we can nevertheless observe the impact that this new Asian
force has already made outside its borde r s.
nized by about 25 nations.

The Peking regime has been r e cog-

It has a mounting international influence, particularly

in Asia, as was clearly indicated at the Bandung Conference last year.

It is

exerting an increasing control over huge Chinese communities in such Southeast
Asian cities as Bangkok, Singapore, and Djakarta.

It has an expanding trade,

particularly with the countries to the south, a trade which was initiated with
barters of raw material s and food but which is now spreading to include a flood of
low- priced consumer goods of Chinese manufacture .
In the military realm, the nature of the Peking regime is already too
evident.

We have seen how, with the support of the Soviet Union, this new power

rapidly enveloped the China mainland, how it rolled into position for an invasion
of Formosa, how it spilled over into Korea and how it made its presence felt in
Northern Indochina.
Not only in militar y matters, but in other ways, Peking has aligned
its policies with those of the Soviet Union.

The latter has supplied the Chinese

Communists with ideological guidance , diplomatic assistance. and other aid.
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Most of all, the Soviet Union has provided the implements of war and destruction.
The Chinese people have paid dearly for this assistance.

They have paid for it

with the products of their land, with the sweat of their labor and even with their
lives.
Whether the present upheavals in the Soviet Union will have a
significant influence on the Moscow -Peking alignment remains to be seen.
Certainly, recent developments in Europe suggest that possibility.
repercussions may be in China, however , is another matter.
penchant will find in this question a wide field for speculation.

What the

Those with the
At this point it

would be well, in my opinion, to acknowledge frankly that we do not know .
Speculation, however interesting it may be, ought not to divert us
from the immediate realities which confront American policy in the Far East .

As

I have al ready noted, the most formidable of these realities is the existence of a
powerful and hostile regime in Peking.

We are still faced with the hostility of

that regime, regardless of what inner changes may be taking place in world com munism .

This hostility confronts us most directly in the Korean and Formosan

situations.
In both, the pea.ce of the Far East and perhaps of the world still hangs
in dangerous balance.
I<orea remains divided today at the 38th Parallel as it was in 1945,
and there are no signs of a permanent peace in that country .

It is true that an

armistice concluded in 1953 stilled the gu.ns along this dividing line between the
Communist world and the free nations.

How long will this tenuous truce, this

- 6 uncertain truce, contin,\e to hold?
vented the terms of the cease-fire.
tary situation.

The Communists in Ncrth Korea have circumThe truce was supposed to freeze the mili-

But the Communists have gone on augmenting their military

forces, particularly their air strength,

A Neutral }\lations Commission charged

with supervising the armistice to prevent violations has been crippled by the nonneutrality of the Polish and Czech members.
its activities.

It has now been forced to terminate

The desire of the Koreans for unification -- and it is an under-

standable desire --was exhausted by the recent bloodletting.

Now it is rising

again, rising to a level of impatience.
In these circ:u.nslances how can anyone talk glibly of peace in Korea?
Any incident along the 3ath Parallel could touch off a renewal of the conflict.
full-scale h ostilities are resumed, this country will not avoid their impact .

If
We

are deeply committed by word and action to the preservation of a free republic of
Korea and two diviaions o.i our armed forces remain in l{orea to sustain that
commitment.
In Formosa, a situation of comparable danger exists.
It is time to set the record straight with respect to that situation.

We

have had more words th<m wisdom in this matter, more press agentry than
policy-making.

It is no wonder that the American people and others are confused

as to our purposes and policies.
Let us get one point straight once and for all.
never had any desire to possess the island cf Formosa.

This country has
The Communist propa-

gandists who have made these charges know that they are wholly false.

They
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know that had such been our intention we were in a military position at the end
of ''lorld War II to realize it.

It was not our intention then; it is not our intention

now.
This country does, however, have legitimate interests in the fate of
Formosa, interests by right of the sacrifices we made in World War II and by
right of the sacrifices made in carrying out a United Nations decision to stop
aggression in Korea.

We have the right to expect that the status of that island is

net such as to establish a springboard for eventual aggression against other free
nations and ourselves in the future.

We have a right and an obligation, a l ong with

other nations, to see to it that the people on the island - - people who were once
ruled by a Japan which was defeated by us -- to see to it that they are not as a
consequence of that defeat subjected to a blood bath through no cause of thei1· own.
How were we to safeguard these interests and discharge these
responsibilities in the light of events on the Chinese mainland after World War II ?
From

19~9

on, Formosa became a target of invasion of the Chinese Communists

and a refuge of the Government of Chiang Kai-ahek.

Were we to permit th at

invasion especially at a tune when we and others were faced with an aggression
in Korea?
Since 1949, moreover, the people of Formosa have depended heavily
on the policies of this

cout~try

for their safety and well-being.

American assist-

ance has made possible a great improvement in their living conditions .
trained, equipped, and sustained armed forces fer their security .

It has

American

military pcwer has served to forestal\ an invasion of the island and to prevent
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the widespread cteath a"'lc.!
have

a~co•npanied

'lc:;va~ta~il)r

among the Formosan people which would

st:ch an in,asion.

At t:t! u.ltl; ·eak of the I<orean conflict in 1950, an .Executive
interposed the
r-<orean

St::v~"'d' F 1 ~et

aggress10~

to ether

in thE' Formosan Straits to i!'lhibit a spread of the

<::.~eas

h the Far .East.

The action served its purpose.

A measure of tranquillity settled over the Formosan at·ea .

new Executive Orders and bombast

We have seen the result.

Communist invasion onN :..fiain inter.s ified .

President found it

ilO

nec;e·::::~a:-y

hovers on the brink
T~

The threat of

.Sy 1955 it had :.-eached such a point

longPr felt able to handle the matter alone.

The

to qeek Congressional support for desperate '

measures to save F::>rmosa.
more deeply and inextric.:ab

For three years there

Then in l<l53 this situation was suddenly altered by

were no attempted invasion!l.

that the Executive l3:.:ar ch

Ord~1

Vh are now back whel'e we were in 1950, except
~'

enn'eshed than ever

bt~~ore

in a situation which

o~ w~.r.

reverr:al. o£ roti .. v in

Administration, unlike it::J

~953

pr-edec.,as~r,

of the war in the Far East beyond t<orea.
Administration has desn·{'d

';~

p-revent

not have negotiated a truce in Kot-ea,

would h<'.'Jt• been •mderstandable if this

was not be"\v on ?reventing an extension
As fa.r as ! can

~.-l-c :1.

a,.,

e·.cte~.sion.

~ee,

however, this

Oth<:rwise, it would

Otherwise, it would have supported

Chiang t<ai-shek's aspirations to liberate the mainlanci which it has not done.
Otherwise, it would ha·.,.e
done.

~:-·de:'"ed

a bombbg beyond the Yalu which it has not

Otherwi!le, it would net b::! negotiating with the Chinese Communists in

Geneva as it has been doi.1g for tJ-.e pasl year.

.

..:

·.
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It seems to me that the policy which this Administration is following

with respect to Communist China does not differ in principle with that of its
predecessor.

The words may be different.

The substance is the s<\me.

The pos lures may be different.

Our present course is a policy that is neither

peace nor war but a polic) ?f the in-between . It differs in one respect from
the previous policy.

It gambles more recklessly with the risk of full - scale war

in the Far East.
We may either applaud o r depl o re this state of affairs.
thing we cannot do is tc cl 'Se our eyes to its actuality.

The one

Nor can we ignore the

fact that history suggests that relations among nations in a state of hostility
do not remain suspended indefinitely on a razor's edg e .

Sooner or tater, they

veer towards one or the other, towards greater conflict or towards closer
relations.
I do not know what will emerge -eventually from this anomalous
situation with respect to Co1nmuuist China.

As I have already noted, the

po licies and attitudes of this government as well as those of Peking will pro foundly influence the outcom.c ,

So, too, will circumstances around the rim of

the A s ian mainland.
In our policies we have counted heavily on the clos e re l ations
which we have maintained with Japan and the Philippines since the end of
World War II.

We have

co~otnted

on these two nations and others to work with

us for the preservation of peace, {c r mutual defense against aggres sian in that
region.

-tO-

These relations with the free nations of the Far East cannot be
expected to flourish of their own accord.

They require a constant toning which

can be supplied only by perceptive and creative foreign policies,

We have seen

in the last few weeks how the lack of such policies can give rise to serious
strains in a relationship a.s close even as that of the United States and the
Philippines.

The clumsy handling of the question of sovereignty over American

military bases in that country threatened to undermine in a moment years of
constructive effort and the provision of extensive assistance.

Fortunately, the

Executive Branch has acted, however belatedly, to correct this ineptitude.
If strains can develop so quickly in relations with the Philippines,
how much more likely are they to appear in our ties with other Asian countries,
ties which are of more recent date and as yet largely untried.
The fact is, Mr. President, that strains have appeared elsewhere.
They have appeared most

s~nificantly

with respect to Japan.

not yet developed their own defense forces.

The Japanese have

There is nevertheless a growing

resentment in Japan a.gainst contiuued dependency on the United States for defense.
The Japanese are also beginning to press for a roe turn of the Bonins and Okinawa.
These strategic islands are presently held by this country but their ultimate
status was left uncertain in the Japanese treaty.

The Japanese show signs, too,

of a gathering impatience with restrictions on their trade with Communist China.
They are maintaining these restrictions in accord with the United Nations
embargo but they have seen other nations ignore or circumvent them.
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V/hile Japanese-American relations are undergoing strains, Japan
is preparing to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union looking to a trea ty of
peace and the restoration of diplomatic relations.

There were such negotiations

in the past but they ran into the hard wall of Soviet intr ansigeance .

As is evid ent

elsewhere in the world, however, Soviet policies are shifting rapidly and there
is no r eason to assume that they will not change with respect to Japan .
If the Soviet Union means to have diplomatic re l ations with the
Japanese, they have much to offer.
which may be returned .
Soviet Asia.

There are islands to the north of J apan

There are valuable fishing concessions in the wat ers of£

There are in"portant trade and economic concessions.

There is

membership in the United Nations long sought by Japan and long deni ed by the
Soviet veto.

There are, finally, Japanese prisoners of ··Vor l d War II still he ld

in Soviet Siberia to be returned.
Mr . President, I belleve this country would be well - advised to expec t
the restoration of Soviet-Japanese relations in the near future.
it is probably coming soon.

It is coming and

So, too, is the likelihood of a sharp expansion of

Japanese trade with the Asian mainland.
These developments are to be anticipated in a Japan which must
literally fish and trade on a vast scale to survive in peace.

The J apanese are

compelled to search where they can for opportunities to do both.

They can find,

they have found, many opportunities for trade with free nations .

Increasingl y,

however, their efforts in that direction begin to run into the political reality of
the adjustments which free nations have to make in their own economies if they
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ar.! to acc ~ .-r.r:"lcdatc Japanese trade.

T~ put the problem bluntly, how far are

the free nations prepared to go in admitting imports from Japan?
V!e had better face the fact that the Communist nations of Asia arc
in a position to offer significant opportunities to Japan for trade and fishing as
well as other economic concessions.

If they make such offers sufficiently

attractive, as sooner or later they may be expected to do, the Japanese are going
to tal<e them.
The development of increasing Japanese economic contact with the
Asian mainland need net in itself constitute a cause for alarm.
in the possible political repercussion of this development.

The danger lies

It seems to me that

adverse consequences in this respect can be held in check by intelligent policies
on the part of this country, Japan, and other free nations.
I am not suggesting a competition of concessione with the Soviet bloc
to hold Japan to our side.
the keeping.

What

I~

A Japan which could be kept in that fashion is nol worth

suggesting, however, is that we rec ognize that the

present alignment of Japan with the free nations requires more than pious statements for its preservation.

It requires action., mutually beneficial action, in the

economic realm, in the cultural realm and in matters of military defense.

If there is an absence of intelligent policy directed to this end, we
shall live to see the ugly consequences of the failure.

VTe shall live to see a

Japan in headlong flight into t'1e Communist orbit or embarked once again on
some form of militarist totalitarianism of its own.

-n I do not mean to suggest, Mr. President, that these dangers are
imminent.

They are there, nevertheless , in the background.

They do not

provide any greater cause for complacency over the safety and welfare of this
country than does the ambivalent situation with respect to Communist China.
Nor are present circumstances much more reassuring elsewhere in
the East.

I have already covered the situation in Southeast Asia in a previous

statement in this series and I shall not take the time of the Senate to go over the
same ground toc.lay.
I should lil<e to emphasize, however, that American relationships
throughcut that area e-n· it• serious need o£ repair, goodwill tours of the Vice
President

which I highly approve of in principle -- notwithstanding.
'fie had one more evidence of neglect cf these relations just a few

days ago.

The former King of Cambodia, in Moscow, linked his country 's

future closely with that of Russia .
events except ourselves.

We have no one to blame for this turn of

It was apparent last year that despite the vast efforts

which this country was making to help the Cambodian nation through the first
years of independence, our relations with that country were deteriorating .
In my report on Cambodia to the Foreign Relations Committee last
October I noted:
The /United States 7 aid programs, if properly
administered can oe hei{>ful . . . and of lasting benefit
to beth countries. It seems to me essential, however,
to emphasize that unless great caution and restraint
is exercised in administering American assistance it
will produce not only an inexcusable waste of American
funds but serious dis locations in Cambodia. Aid can
act to the benefit of our relations with that country but

• l4 •
it can also act to their detriment; it depends on how
the program is handled. . . . I recommend that the
Executive branch review carefully the extent of all
our activity in Cambodia. It has grown rapidly in
the past year, as has the number of official
Americans in Cambodia, and size in either case
is not the measure of what best serves this nation 'e
interest.
Was such a 1eview, a full scale r eview of our activities in Cambod1a
ever undertaken? Not to my knowledge, Mr. President.

Instead, a situation

obvious ly bad months ago was allowed to go on deteriorating while millions of
dollars and numerous officials were poured into Cambodia.
quences.

We see the conse-

Now there will undoubtedly be a review ·- but the damage has already

been done.
It should be dear, Mr. President, from the quotaticns I have just
read that when 1 suggest that our relations with Southeast Asia are in need of
repair, I am not suggesting bigger aid programs.

I

~

suggesting, as I have

suggested many times, and as the Committee on Foreign Relations will now undertake, a full-scale reappraisal of the existing aid programs,

I~

pique and more pe rception in dealing with the Asian countries.

suggesting les a

I~ suggesting

better coordination of the statements and activities of the Executive Branch
affecting those countries.

I~

suggesting that we wake up to the fact that

Communist penetration of this region -- commercial, diplomatic and ideological
--is deep and it is increasing and that its success is due in no small part to the
ineffectiveness of our policies and the way they are being adm inistered.
Mr. President, I noted at the outset the difficulties in holding to an
effective course in the Far East.

It seems to me high time, however, that this

government faces up to the difficultles.

a
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The foreign policy of this nation for the Far East or any region cannot
be based on glib catchwords and slick phrases.

If it is to serve our interests,

that policy must grow out of a comprehension of our national interests in the
Far East.

These interests, as I understand them, lie in a peace which

satisfies the reasonable needs of security o f this country against aggression.
They lie in a flourishing commerce and in scientific, c ult ural and religious ties
which can enrich our lives.
None of these interests can be pu rsued in a vacuum , in isolation.
cannot have the security of peace in the Far East, alone .
have commerce there, alone.

We

We obviously cannot

And obvio usly, we cannot hav e scientific, cultural

and religious ties, alone.
We can, in short, pursue our interests in the Far East on ly in concert
with ethers .

We can do so only i£ there is a recipr ocal desire for intercourse

on the part of others and a willingness to adjust the attitude and policies of all to
make this intercourse possible .
That is not presently the case with China.

We have had only a con -

tinuous hostility emanating from that source ever since the Pe'dng regime came
to power and we have replied inevitably in kind.
bullied and browbeaten,

The Chinese Communists have

They have inflicted thousands of unnecessary casualties

on the forces of this country and others by their intervention in T<:orea.
have ec,.., urged and villified the good name of the United States .

They

They have turned

the sentiments of the Chinese people against us, sentiments built on a century o r
more of f r iendly contact.

·•
- 16 I do not eay that the attitude of Cbina towards the United States will
never change.

Those of us who have lived through World ';{ar II and the fan t astic

changes of the past few years should know by now that there are few

11

nevers 11 in

the r e lations among nations.
I do say, ho wev e r, tangib le evidence of change in China does not no w
exist.

I do say that unless the !<oreans have an opportunity to achieve their unity

and independence in peace, such evidence does not exist.

I do say that unless it

is clear that the statu s of F o rmosa can be determined without the bloo dlettin g
which a Communist invasion would inflict on the people of t hat island, there is no
evidence of change.

If the Executive Branch does have such evidence growing out of its
year-long conversations with t h e Chinese Communists in Geneva, then the time
is r apidly approaching when it should so inform the American people.

If it do es

not, we may well ask why the se conversations are being c o ntinued ,
I think it is time, too, for the Executive Branch to make clear that
we do n e t re t aliate on the entire Chinese peopl e, the hostility which the Peking
government direc t s at us.

The ties, the deep ties, which once linked the people

of this country with the people of China -- religious ties, cultura l ties, commercial ties -- can survive this period o f separation enforced by t he Peking regime.
They will survive, howev e r, :)nly if the words and actio ns of this gove r nment
make it clear that we wish the m tc- sur vive.

I.£ we are estopFed fro m o ur historical c o ntact with the Chinese people
at this time, we are not prevented from re info rcing o ur relations with the rest c f

- 17 -

Asia.

In a sense, that is what we have been trying to do .

That is the lo gic of

the defen se tre aties with Japan, the Philippines and other nations .
in the vast aid pro grams.

It is the logic

It is the lo gic of the information program.

And, lo gically, too , it is time to find out why these policies are not
working as they shou l d, why, as in Cambodia, they are producing effects opposite
from which we ho ped they would produce.

It is time for the Executive Branch to

r e a s sess thes e pro grams and the way they are being administered.

It is time for

the Executive Branch to r e view carefully its diplomatic practices and personnel
in the Far East.

It is time for that branch to wake up to the existence of strains

in our relali.ons with m any nation s in that area and to adjust our policies to reduce
these strains.

It is time for new measures which will strengthen the ties between

ourselves and Asian nations.
Ten years ago , Mr. President, this country was welcomed with a
deep and genuine enthusiasm througho ut Asia, from Korea to Australia, from
the P hilip pines t o Afghanistan.
strained.

Year by year the welcome has become more

Despite vast efforts, the welcome is now a grudging one in some

countries; in others it is no welcome at all.
ourselves why.

It is time, Mr. President, to ask

Even m ore important, it -i.s time to find out why .

